

# **AN ASSESSMENT OF CONVENTIONAL AND SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES INTEGRATION IN HAITI**

**A MONOGRAPH  
BY  
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**First Term AY 96-97**

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**DTIC QUALITY INSPECTED 3**

19970506 030

# REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE

Form Approved  
OMB No. 0704-0138

Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0138), Washington, DC 20503.

1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank) 2. REPORT DATE 20 December 1996 3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED Monograph, 24 June - 20 December 96

4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE 5. FUNDING NUMBERS

An Assessment of Conventional and Special Operations Forces Integration in Haiti

6. AUTHOR(S)

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7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER

SCHOOL OF ADVANCED MILITARY STUDIES  
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COM (913) 684-3437 AUTOVON 552-3437

9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 10. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY REPORT NUMBER

11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES

12a. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT 12b. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT

Distribution statement A

"A"

"Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited."

13. ABSTRACT (Maximum 200 words)

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This monograph shows that the principles of OOTW and the integration of conventional and special operations forces are directly related to the success or failure of specific events in UPHOLD DEMOCRACY. The study concludes that the principles of OOTW are the basis for success in operations like UPHOLD DEMOCRACY in terms of force integration and inter-relationships. Military operations in Haiti during Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY confirm the doctrinal requirement for close cooperation between conventional and special operations forces in OOTW environments.

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SCHOOL OF ADVANCED MILITARY STUDIES

MONOGRAPH APPROVAL

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Title OF Monograph: An Assessment of Conventional and Special Operations  
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Accepted this 20th day of December 1996

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#### ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I would like to thank my colleagues and professors for their untiring patience, editing, hours of professional guidance, and interesting discussion. Without them my SAMS experience would have not been as meaningful or as productive. Each of them made my MMAS research experience worthwhile. I would like to especially thank Robert H. Berlin Ph.D., John T. Fishel Ph.D., Robert F. Baumann Ph.D. and Lieutenant Colonel Walter E. Kretchik for their assistance in my research.

I would also like to thank my wife Jane and daughter Caroline for their understanding and continuing support. Thank you all very much.

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## CHAPTER 1

### INTRODUCTION

Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY (Haiti 1993-1995) is now complete and the soldiers are back at their homestations or off on new adventures. The military actions that occurred during this operation have been and will continue to be discussed for the purposes of writing the history and reviewing the details of its execution. This monograph focuses on the tactical level relationship between conventional and special operations forces.

As an operation other than war, UPHOLD DEMOCRACY is viewed as a success by many general officers and the after action reports from the commanders of the operation.<sup>1</sup> Glowing compliments about the relationship between conventional and special operations forces are found in many of these, such as the 10<sup>th</sup> Mountain Division After Action Report and the Joint After Action Report published by the United States Atlantic Command. According to these sources, all went well concerning the operation, but did it?

There were two distinctly different types of forces in this operation, special operations forces and conventional forces. According to army doctrine, the inter-relationship between conventional and special operations forces at the operational level of war and the tactical level of war is key to the importance of success.<sup>2</sup> This force inter-relationship is conveyed in army doctrine by the principle "unity of effort" within the principles of operations other than.<sup>3</sup> These doctrinal principles apply to both types of forces at the tactical and operational level of operations other than war. "Unity of effort," as

well as the other principles provides the guidance for commanders and planners to govern their activities and performance in these operations.<sup>4</sup> Because this operation may be a model for future operations of this type, several questions are raised.<sup>5</sup>

Were the principles within the U.S. Army doctrine of operations other than war (OOTW) followed? If so, were they effective? Are the principles correct? Was the relationship on the ground at the tactical level as productive and efficient as it should have been according to doctrinal principles? This study reviews some of the events and inter-relationships between conventional and special operations forces during Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY in Haiti from 1993 to 1995 and determines if the army doctrine on OOTW was valid based upon the principles of OOTW.

Haiti and The Dominican Republic are the two countries that make up the Island of Hispaniola in the Caribbean Sea. Haiti is among the poorest countries in the world with a gross national product of only \$380 per capita (last known accurate data as of 1980).<sup>6</sup> The island gained its independence from French colonial rule in 1804. Haiti was split into a northern and southern part and led by separate leaders until 1844, when The Republic of Santo Domingo (now the Dominican Republic) declared its independence.<sup>7</sup>

This country of former slaves remained in turmoil for more than fifty years until 1915, when the United States intervened and occupied Haiti to restore order from the despotic rule. The U.S. signed a treaty with Haiti that provided economic and political assistance for ten years and extended for another ten years later.<sup>8</sup> In 1934, the nineteen year U.S. occupation ended when U.S. Marines were withdrawn.<sup>9</sup> General political unrest in Haiti continued through the 1950's and into the 1980's with the father and son consecutive regime of Francois and Jean Claude Duvalier with their personal armed force called the Tonton

Macoute.<sup>10</sup> An exodus to the United States began in early 1980's as a result of political oppression and severe poverty set in. After several attempts to maintain some sort of political foundation, A Roman Catholic priest won an internationally supervised election in February 1991. In September 1991 Jean-Bertrand Aristide, the elected president of Haiti was ousted by a military coup and went into exile in the United States.<sup>11</sup>

After the coup, thousands of Haitians attempted to flee to the United States. The United States Coast Guard returned many of them. Hundreds of others ended up on the Florida beaches directly impacting on the United States.<sup>12</sup> The U.S. government requested help from the United Nations in solving the problem. The United Nations responded by coordinating a multi-national embargo aimed at putting pressure on coup leader Lieutenant General Raoul Cedras, commander in chief of the Forces Armees d'Haiti (FAd'H). On July 3, 1993, the United States brokered settlement known as the Governors Island Accord. This ten step plan developed to return democracy to Haiti, called for Cedras to step down and Aristide to recover his presidency. On September 23, 1993, the United Nations Security Council passed Resolution 867 authorizing an expanded mission in support of the transition from Cedras to Aristide.<sup>13</sup>

The United Nations began its work in Haiti in 1992 when it sent eighteen observers to monitor and report on human-rights abuses.<sup>14</sup> The number grew to over two hundred observers called the International Civilian Mission (ICM) a year later. The Accord called for the removal of the military in Haiti in two parts. First, an International Police Monitor (IPM) force was sent in to "establish and train an independent, professional, civilian police force."<sup>15</sup> Second, a Joint Task Force Haiti with 599 U.S. and 110 Canadian military personnel who, under UN operational control, was supposed to "conduct military training and

humanitarian/civic action programs in support of Haitian democratization."<sup>16</sup> The plan was set for the key leaders of the FAd'H to resign on October 15, 1993 and for President Aristide to return on October 30 1993.

On October 11, 1993, the USS Harlan County attempted to dock at the Port-au-Prince port facility with the needed personnel and equipment for the mission. The ship met an armed paramilitary type resistance and turned away.<sup>17</sup> This resistance was an armed group of unruly thugs determined to disrupt the landing. The overall U.N. plan was set back because of several misunderstandings. One such misunderstanding about the U.N. Resolution 867 was the word "modernization," which the FAd'H understood as obtaining better lethal weapons, not at all what the U.N. meant.<sup>18</sup> This was one of the things that led to the change from the expected permissive, cooperative environment to one that now turned violent.<sup>19</sup> The United States military continued over the next year to work on other plans to deal with this developing situation while the U.S. State Department and the U.N. continued to try and solve the problems diplomatically.

On October 15, 1994, President Jean-Bertrand Aristide finally returned to his capital city of Port-au-Prince, Haiti after waiting in exile in the United States since 1991.<sup>20</sup> This marked an important chapter in the history and the democratic future of Haiti. The United States "successfully" led a large military operation known as UPHOLD DEMOCRACY which was the passe-partout to the ousting of coup leader Lieutenant General Raoul Cedras who led a repressive regime from September 1991 until September 19, 1994.<sup>21</sup>

UPHOLD DEMOCRACY is an important operation to the U.S. military. In the future, when another mission is undertaken by conventional and special operations forces together in an operation other than war, it

will be planned similar to this one.<sup>22</sup> The 10<sup>th</sup> Mountain Division After Action Review states: "In the future this operation will serve as a model for future SOF missions and conventional missions that include SOF."<sup>23</sup> This is characteristic of statements made by many high ranking military officers regarding the inter-relationships between conventional and special operations in Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY. Many lower ranking, tactical level officers and non-commissioned officers involved in the operation stated it should not serve as a model for future operations.<sup>24</sup> Why, after such a successful operation is there a difference of opinion about how future military operations are planned and conducted?

UPHOLD DEMOCRACY included over 20,000 service members from all services including United States Army special and conventional forces as well as units from 24 other nations.<sup>25</sup> UPHOLD DEMOCRACY included special operations such as an airfield seizure, hostage rescue and close quarter combat requiring special operations force's skills and equipment to clear and secure buildings. The conventional force's operations included in this operations plan (OPLAN) focused on tasks to secure the capital city of Port-au-Prince for the safe return of President Aristide. Additionally, some operations combined both conventional and special operation forces in order to execute the more complicated missions or were sequenced to turn objectives over from one type of force to the other. Several of the operations in UPHOLD DEMOCRACY, Haiti (1993-1995), where conventional and special operations forces worked together, provide data for this monograph.

Haiti has been a concern of the United States for several years. The democratic election in Haiti was mentioned by the President of the United States George Bush in the 1991 National Security Strategy.<sup>26</sup> The

successful election in Haiti was an important step in the future of Haiti, albeit a delicate step toward democracy.

This fragile democracy in Haiti fell apart when President Jean-Bertrand Aristide was deposed seven months after his election.<sup>27</sup> The United States began examining options to return President Aristide to Port-au-Prince immediately after the coup. These efforts were political in nature, but later required the use of military force as an option to remove Cedras and return Aristide and democracy to Haiti.

The small Caribbean country of Haiti was under great internal political stress leading to the ousting of President Jean-Bertrand Aristide by Lieutenant General Cedras. While President Aristide was in exile in the United States, many political and military options were planned to restore democracy in Haiti. The military plan discussed in this study, UPHOLD DEMOCRACY, included a forceful entry into a violent environment to seize Port-au-Prince and then secure the country for the safe return of President Aristide.

On September 16, 1994, President Clinton sent a negotiating team to explain the consequences of military action to General Cedras in order to settle the problem without bloodshed. The delegation included former President Jimmy Carter; former Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff, General (ret) Colin Powell; and Senator Sam Nunn (D-GA), Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee. The group met with Lieutenant General Cedras while the invasion force was enroute to remove Cedras by force.<sup>28</sup> At the last minute, as the airplanes carrying the invasion force were in flight, a settlement was negotiated and the forceful entry was avoided. Instead a more peaceful entry was executed to accomplish the restoration of the president and democracy in Haiti. The peaceful entry plan was one of many plans the National Command Authority had to chose from.

There were numerous military options with different degrees of military involvement and different types of forces planned to address the problems in Haiti. By 1993, there were two operation plans (OPLANs) developed that became the mainstay of the operation. These were OPLAN 2380-95 and OPLAN 2370-95. The latter began as a Top Secret plan to invade or conduct what became known as a "forcible entry."<sup>29</sup> This force consisted of a multi-service force under a Joint Task Force designated as JTF-180.<sup>30</sup> "JTF-180 was formed around the Army's XVIII Airborne Corps, Fort Bragg, North Carolina, commanded by Lieutenant General Henry Shelton."<sup>31</sup> The United States Atlantic Command (USACOM) was the higher headquarters for JTF-180. ACOM was responsible for providing additional forces and "force protection for the soon to be multinational and United Nation forces operating in Haiti."<sup>32</sup> The final plan submitted on June 20, 1994 to the Commander in Chief of United States Atlantic Command (CINCUSACOM) was approved and briefed to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General John M. Shalikashvili.<sup>33</sup>

OPLAN 2380-95 was another entry plan, but under permissive conditions in a much less violent environment. This OPLAN called for an additional joint task force focused on a less restrictive planning environment with a multinational force made up of countries from the United Nations and the Organization of American States (OAS). This operation was a "U.S.-led , multinational military intervention authorized by the UN to restore the legitimate, democratically-elected government of Haiti to power."<sup>34</sup> CINCUSACOM ordered JTF-190 activated for planning on July 3, 1994. OPLAN 2380-95 was built around the "Army's 10<sup>th</sup> Mountain Division (LI), Fort Drum, New York and commanded by Major General David Meade."<sup>35</sup>

Also in place since October 1993, was JTF-120, (later designated JTF-160) conducting maritime interdiction operations (MIO) and support

of a possible non-combatant evacuation operation (NEO) under operation ABLE MANNER. Redesignated as JTF-160, the JTF conducted operation SEA SIGNAL PHASE V, the name given to the operation responsible for Haitian migrant processing at afloat and shore locations.<sup>36</sup>

The Joint Special Operations Task Force (JSOTF), aboard the USS America was comprised of special operation forces and played a major role in the invasion plan. This special operations force included U.S. Army Special Forces and Rangers, Navy Sea-Air-Land teams (SEAL), Army Aviation special aircraft such as the MH-6 "Little Birds" and others prepared to execute violent operations with precision on extremely difficult targets.<sup>37</sup> Many special operations were planned, generally aimed at getting control of Port-au-Prince within a matter of minutes. Once the critical targets were controlled the plan called for their turn over to conventional forces. Two of these key targets were Camp d'Application located East of Port-au-Prince and the Dessalines barracks which housed the Haitian armed forces (Fad'H) located next to the National Palace.<sup>38</sup> By September 14, 1994, the stage was set for special military operations in Haiti from the USS America.

Earlier on July 31, 1994, The United Nations Security Council approved Resolution 940 that supported the U.S. led, multinational force using "all means necessary" to remove Lieutenant General Cedras from power.<sup>39</sup> One of the first steps taken by the U.S. was to dispatch the USS Wasp (LHA-1) with a Special Purpose Marine Air Ground Task Force Caribbean (SPMAGTF Carib), and the Amphibious Readiness Group (ARG). The purpose of the ARG was to relieve the USS Inchon (LPH-12) on August 11, 1994, while the focus of the SPMAGTF was to prepare for a possible NEO.<sup>40</sup>

The commanders of both JTF-180 and JTF-190 began positioning forces in order to execute the combination of OPLANs 2380-95 and OPLAN



2370-95 known as the OPLAN 2380+ option. This positioning of forces put U.S. troops in Guantanamo, Cuba and Great Inagua with supplies and equipment. The movement eventually included two aircraft carriers, the USS Eisenhower (CV-69) and USS America (CV-66), void of its normal payload of naval aviation assets and loaded with various Army and special operations helicopters on board.<sup>41</sup>

At 182201Z September 1994, aboard the USS Mt Whitney (LCC-20), Lieutenant General Shelton was given the order to execute OPLAN 2370-95 and set the H-hour at 190401Z September 1994.<sup>42</sup> As the invasion force completed last minute preparation the negotiating team convinced Lieutenant General Cedras to step down from power immediately and depart Haiti. CINCUSACOM then ordered the cessation of the forcible entry operation and the execution of the permissive entry option, OPLAN 2380+ to begin.<sup>43</sup>

This large force, including both special and conventional forces from different services, was structured with two separate JTFs and several subordinate units. These troops were loaded aboard ships and others in aircraft prepared to conduct invasion assaults on their targets by parachute. This troop movement was a large undertaking and required close coordination and cooperation between all of the services involved. Army doctrine provides guidance for this coordination between forces.

Integration and interaction between both special operation and conventional forces is essential to the success of any joint military operation.<sup>44</sup> Both forces are designed for different purposes. Special operations forces are defined in Joint Pub 3-05 as:

Special operations forces- Military units of the Army, Navy, and Air Force which are designated for special operations, as that term is defined, and are organized, trained, and equipped specifically to conduct special operations. Also called SOF.<sup>45</sup>

The conventional force is the standard U.S. military

organization comprising the major part of the force for this operation and defined as "those forces capable of conducting operations using nonnuclear weapons."<sup>46</sup> The differences in these two forces is the types of missions they have and the kind of operation they conduct. Normally, special operations soldiers start out in the conventional forces. The rank structure of special operations is generally more senior than the conventional force. For instance, in special forces there is an assessment and selection program that only accepts sergeants and above for acquisition into the branch. Special operations forces conduct operations that usually require specialized training and techniques. Conventional forces normally do not maintain these capabilities. Conventional forces conduct more standard military operations with conventional weapons and techniques accordingly. The mission can be the same in both forces, but because of the techniques required, special equipment or amount of precision required, the operation may be assigned to the special operations force instead of the conventional force. The operations in Haiti (1993 to 1995) were an example of how these types of forces can execute a more complete and broad range of missions when in concert, supporting one another in operations other than war (OOTW).

This study focuses on the special operation force (SOF) integration and interaction with conventional (general purpose) forces. Using Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY in Haiti (1993 to 1995) as a case study, this monograph researches the question whether or not the doctrinal and operational parameters for force integration of special operation forces and conventional forces is doctrinally correct. Since doctrine, the way the U.S. Army fights its wars, is based on established principles of war that guide the army to successful operations, this study uses the principles of operations other than war as the criteria to evaluate the data.<sup>47</sup>

Doctrine or the "engine of change" as General Gordon R. Sullivan called it, should set the direction for such future military operations.<sup>48</sup> If the doctrinal and operational parameters are found to be correct, then the future operations other than war should have the same success based on that correct doctrine. If the doctrine and operational parameters such as the principles of OOTW are incorrect, the potential exists for mistakes possibly leading to unsuccessful operations. The 10<sup>th</sup> Mountain Division After Action Review states: "this operation will serve as a model," confirmation that this operation is considered the one to emulate.<sup>49</sup>

There were several U.S. and multinational branch plans with military options to address the problems in Haiti. Every plan was developed with some level of special operation forces committed to the successful outcome. Since the nature of the problem was not combat, in the historic sense, it was an operation other than war which called for different skills other than shooting and maneuvering. Special forces soldiers filled the requirement with not only the "Green Berets", but the psychological operation forces and civil affairs elements to meet the OOTW requirements. These combined special operations forces and conventional forces were needed to accomplish the overall mission of restoring democracy. Neither of these two forces could accomplish the overall mission in isolation because of vast number of unique requirements. Some of these called for special equipment, such as boats, normally not part of the conventional force, just to get to the locations to conduct the operation. Other operations required conventional style equipment and techniques, such as security operations at command headquarters. This type of operation did not require the special training or equipment of the special forces and therefore not appropriate for special operations forces. These conventional missions

also did not justify the special operations imperatives or the special operations mission criteria, normally used to determine whether or not special operations forces are employed.<sup>50</sup> Therefore the integration and close working relationships of conventional and special forces were required to best complete this operation and achieve mission success.

The author's experience with the events in Haiti extends from the early operations of Joint Task Force 120, activated on 16 October 1993, to a task force commander aboard the USS America during the landing of United States forces in Haiti. JTF 120 conducted a Maritime Interdiction Operation where the author was a planner for special operations with the Special Marine Amphibious Task Force aboard the USS Nassau and USS Saipan.<sup>51</sup> The USS America contained the elements comprising Joint Task Force 188 (JTF 188). This platform projected special forces, rangers, and other elements of JTF 188 to conduct special operations as required. Although the author's experience is extensive in the special operations planning and execution of these operations, this monograph focuses on the forces deployed to conduct the longer term special operations and conventional operations that continued long after JTF 188 redeployed.<sup>52</sup>

The study emphasizes doctrine to provide the background necessary to link conventional with special operation forces. Examples of force integration and interaction during events such as the special forces forward operating base relocating away from the joint task force head quarters and the hand over of Camp d'Application and Dessalines Barracks are analyzed in this study. The events studied are just a few of the cases where special and conventional forces had to work together during operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY in order to achieve success.<sup>53</sup>

By analyzing the results of these events in detail and studying the doctrine associated with OOTW this study answers the questions

raised. The evaluation focuses on the operations other than war doctrine used in planning and execution and the reasons why this doctrine is important. The study of doctrine and OOTW is critical to the success of future military operations because UPHOLD DEMOCRACY is described as a model for future operations.

## CHAPTER 2

### DOCTRINE: PRINCIPLES OF OOTW

Doctrine guides U.S. Military leaders and planners in all types of operations, including both combat and OOTW. FM 100-5, Operations and FM 100-23, Peace Operations are two of the Army's manuals that specifically address OOTW and the subordinate operations known as peace operations, peacekeeping and peace enforcement. These operations have become "increasingly common in the post-Cold War strategic security environment."<sup>54</sup> "In fact, since 1988, the number of peace operations has more than doubled, with each succeeding one being more complex than the last."<sup>55</sup>

The term "OOTW" is somewhat controversial. In 1995, the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command issued guidance limiting the term OOTW.<sup>56</sup> The Army is now in the process of developing new terminology for specificity. At the Command and General Staff College there are two popular terms being used in the sense of emerging doctrine; stability operations and support operations. For the purposes of this study, the still current term, OOTW is used to describe the "military activities during peacetime and conflict that do not necessarily involve armed clashes between two organized forces."<sup>57</sup>

Operations in Haiti were planned to account for both combat and OOTW, fully knowing that OOTW are usually longer in duration and may undergo a number of shifts in direction during their course. For instance, one such type of operation forces soldiers to skillfully balance combat style fighting with the more sensitive role of careful evacuation of civilians and officials in such types of OOTW as

noncombatant evacuation operations.<sup>58</sup> A noncombatant evacuation is defined as an "operation that relocates threatened civilian noncombatants from locations in a foreign country or host nation."<sup>59</sup>

The operations in Haiti discussed in this monograph are an example of the U.S. Armed Forces prepared to fight with the combat skill required to swiftly and violently invade the country of Haiti and the preparation and execution of OOTW (peace operations). Caught in the middle of both of these types of operations are the special operation forces. SOF Planners had to plan for specific "special" combat operations initially and also plan for the long term operations (OOTW) such as the support to civil affairs assistance necessary to return the nation to a more peaceful environment. These OOTW were quite often planned and sometimes executed with the integration of SOF and general purpose forces.

At any moment during these peace operations, belligerents could have forced the situation into combat operations even though the focus was peacekeeping. For example, just before the return of President Aristide, large numbers of protesters and supporters formed around the Presidential Palace in Port-au-Prince. This created a very tense situation with the potential of turning violent instantly.<sup>60</sup> Both conventional and special forces possessed the capability to immediately employ combat force if necessary. The peacekeeping skills required of SOF and the general purpose forces were constantly being used to show a strong presence. The two forces maintained a sensitive approach to dealing with the majority of peaceful civilians throughout the country without having to turn to combat operations. Any such break toward a combat role in this sensitive environment might have destroyed all of the hard work and long term peacekeeping efforts in an instant. These forces had to show much patience over a long period of time while

being careful not to promote a sense of dependency or reliance upon the soldiers by the Haitians.

By studying Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY and specifically looking at the opportunities for interaction between both types of forces, it is apparent that the doctrinal parameters for integration and the inter-relationship between special operations forces and conventional forces during combined operations are important. The principles of OOTW must be included with the principles of war and doctrine for conduct of war in the planning process of OOTW.<sup>61</sup> As a measure of the doctrinal and operational parameters for force integration the author uses the Army's Operations Manual, (FM 100-5) definition of the principles of OOTW as criteria in evaluating force integration in the Haiti case study. The principles of OOTW are: objective, unity of effort, legitimacy, perseverance, restraint, and security.<sup>62</sup> "When these principles are ignored, joint force commanders (JFCs) increase the risk to their forces and the possibility of failure."<sup>63</sup> Three of these (objective, security, and unity of command) are also principles of war and are included in the principles of OOTW because of the possibility that combat operations could be included in OOTW. Although normally associated with combat operations, these three particular principles relate to OOTW in this case study specifically with respect to the integration of forces. The principle of perseverance relates to the long term operations and is more applicable to the peacekeeping types of operations in Haiti.

The first principle, although there is no particular priority, is objective. FM 100-5 describes objective as that which "directs every military operation toward a clearly defined, decisive, and attainable objective."<sup>64</sup> It means that each individual operation must be



integrated with the other operations to achieve the strategic aim and purpose of the overall goal. This calls for the leadership and planners to fully understand the goals and aims set by higher authorities. They must then set appropriate objectives that augment the objectives of other units or agencies with a unity of purpose toward the strategic aim.

Objective is an important principle used to evaluate the events discussed in this study. As stated, each action must have a clear goal relating to the overall aim. Therefore all of the actions discussed in this study should in fact indicate its relation to the strategic aim of the operation. This study evaluates some of the actions and tries to find the objective of each of the events discussed.

Relating to objective is unity of effort. Unity of effort is described as that part of reaching the strategic aim through the unity of purpose. FM 100-5 states "seek unity of effort toward every objective."<sup>65</sup> This principle is sometimes difficult to attain in OOTW because of the nature of the operation. In some operations, as sometimes in Haiti, there are other governmental organizations leading particular efforts. Close coordination and planning with these other organizations are necessary to ensure mission accomplishment sometimes under command relationships not common to the military.

This study evaluates specific events during the operations in Haiti to see if unity of effort was indeed a principle adhered to in the planning or execution of each of the events. As one of the main principles it would seem that unity of effort relates directly to the subject of force integration. The principle applies to all forces and agencies and will either be apparent or not in the examples discussed in this study. The degree to which this principle was or was not followed will be important to the outcome of this study. For instance, if the

principle was not followed, the forces might want to look toward improving the doctrine or planning efforts necessary to provide unity of effort.

Legitimacy is principle that requires the forces to sustain the lawfulness of the operation and of the host government, in this case Haiti. FM 100-5 states that legitimacy "derives from the perception that constituted authority is both genuine and effective and employs appropriate means for reasonable purposes."<sup>66</sup> It will be important to this study to explore the facts of whether or not legitimacy was truly a factor in the planning and execution of the events studied in this operation. As a major factor towards success or failure, legitimacy is paramount in the long term strategic aim. If a force at any time diverts from the legitimacy of the government, they may have done so to the detriment of the overall aim. This principle is related to the long term strategic aim as is perseverance, another important principle.

Perseverance is the "protracted application of military capability in support of strategic aims."<sup>67</sup> Most often, OOTW are protracted and may require years of active operations to achieve the strategic aims imposed. It is sometimes very difficult to determine the exact end of the OOTW which usually differs from the decisive end of combat operations. Although, as a commander or planner enters into an OOTW they should not discount the potential for changing to or conducting combat operations or other rapid contingency operations if necessary.

Because of the long term nature of OOTW, perseverance is imperative to successful operations and commanders must continually assess the situation of their success or lack of success. Commanders need to measure the success of the events against the overall aims of the operation and continue to keep going with a fresh attitude and fresh

look at every situation no matter how long the operation lasts.

In this study, perseverance is one of the principles evaluated in each of the events. The case study should determine whether or not the commanders kept in mind the long term effects of the operation with respect to the strategic aims. Viewing the events in detail will reveal whether or not commanders acted or planned over time the integration of special forces with general purpose forces to meet the strategic aim of the operation.

Restraint is the application of "appropriate military capability prudently."<sup>68</sup> This principle is also important with respect to OOTW for several reasons. First, there is a natural tendency for combat ready units or forces to want to apply that combat force. However, in OOTW, it is most often the case where combat power is not at all what it takes to accomplish the mission or objective. Second, the peacekeeping kind of operation can turn violent at any time and apply pressure on commanders to employ combat power in return to resolve an incident effectively. Restraint becomes extremely important in these situations because one act of violence in return may undo other principles such as legitimacy or unity of effort. One unrestrained action may detract from the strategic aim and place the operation back to the beginning stages and take even longer for the forces to achieve the strategic aim.

Rules of engagement are one example of how restraint can be exercised in combat or OOTW.<sup>69</sup> They are the guidelines that each and every soldier must follow to ensure the proper use of weapons and tactics with various levels of violence. These guidelines provide two main purposes. First, they are effective in providing soldiers the guidance on the use of force in order to protect themselves or civilians under different situations. Second, the rules of engagement protect the legitimacy of the operation by ensuring that forces do not escalate the

level of violence unnecessarily and undo the steps taken toward the strategic aims. Because OOTW forces decisions down to soldier levels on the street or in the field, it is important for each and every soldier to fully understand the rules of engagement exactly.

This study uses restraint to evaluate the events and determine whether or not rules of engagement were related to force integration. This study also evaluates restraint in terms of the differences in rules of engagement, if any between the forces. It seems that as a principle of OOTW restraint is important because of how the two types of forces were perceived by the general population. Initial indications are that there was a distinct difference in how troops were treated by the Haitian public because of the uniform they wore. Restraint may play an important role in force integration based on uniform (special or general purpose force) and the relationship between the soldiers and the Haitians. Possibly restraint was directly related to the amount of security these two types of forces required in conducting their operations.

Security is a protective measure or system of measures designed to "never permit the hostile factions to acquire an unexpected advantage."<sup>70</sup> In OOTW, commanders must constantly protect their forces and operations to ensure success. Commanders must take measures to keep hostile forces or nations from interfering with and gathering information about the operations or procedures being applied during the operation. Information gathered by hostile nations or factions may assist them in acting against the efforts of the friendly forces or prevent the success of the operation. Over the usual long term operations inherent in OOTW, forces may be lulled into thinking that the risk of compromise or that the hostile intent is nonexistent. As in the other principles of OOTW, it is important for forces to maintain the

ability to rapidly transition to combat operations if necessary.

In this operation force protection was a political issue as well as a military issue when it came to placing U.S. soldiers in harms way during a "peace operation." U.S. leaders placed great emphasis on avoiding casualties in these types of operations. The sensitivity is justified because of the tragic incidents in Somalia in 1993. Army Rangers as part of the special operations force in Mogadishu, Somalia, conducted an unsuccessful and costly direct action mission in which helicopters were shot down, U.S. personnel were captured, and others were killed during rescue attempts during a "peace operation."<sup>71</sup>

When conducting integrated force operations as in Haiti, it is important to follow the security guidelines and maintain force security as well as operational security at all times. This study will use security to evaluate the events as a criteria and as one of the principles of OOTW to study the events in this case study. Security may have effected the way in which an event occurred or may have effected the outcome of an event.

The doctrinal principles listed above are those specifically associated with OOTW. Other doctrine relates to the process of control and the execution of OOTW. The planning of an OOTW requires detailed mission analysis with emphasis on the use of force, force protection, force training, and force tailoring.<sup>72</sup>

FM 100-25, Doctrine for Army Special Operations Forces states: "special operations forces frequently operate in conjunction with general purpose or convention forces."<sup>73</sup> Usually this is for a short period of time and ends with a passing of responsibility and/or the extraction of special operations forces. The focus should be on the synchronization or timing of the sequenced execution on the ground and not the "physical integration" of special operations forces and

conventional forces.<sup>74</sup> The special operations command and control element (SOCCE) is the crucial link for synchronization between the special operations force and the conventional force.<sup>75</sup>

Operations other than war greatly differ from combat operations because of the degree of force usually employed. These operations are however, similar in terms of doctrinal principles used in planning both types of operations. The principles cannot be violated in either planning or execution of any military operation if one expects to achieve success.

The events discussed in this monograph were chosen for several reasons. First, during the numerous interviews conducted by the author with soldiers in Haiti they were perceived as controversial problems that should not have occurred. Second, these examples are specific to a difficult time period when both special forces and conventional forces were working together toward common goals, yet with different techniques. The examples are also selected because of their potential impact for future similar operations. The related events are discussed in terms of the principles of OOTW as described above and doctrine that was used or should have been used in the planning and execution of these operations.

The integration and inter-relationship between conventional and special operation forces during Operations UPHOLD DEMOCRACY was critical to the success of the operation and will be critical in future operations. Study of the actions and events at the tactical level demonstrates how the principles of operations other than war apply to the planning and execution of the operations. Commanders and planners rely on doctrine when forming operations plans and depend on its principles to ensure compliance with army standards to achieve operational success. The importance of reviewing doctrine after a major

operation is paramount because of the dynamic characteristic of doctrine. The questions raised in this monograph are answered by studying the principles of OOTW as applied in these particular events during Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY .

### CHAPTER 3

#### THE INTEGRATION OF CONVENTIONAL AND SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES

Units participating in Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY held After Action Review (AAR) meetings assessing the results of the overall mission. These results show that the operation was a total success except for some minor difficulties.<sup>76</sup> However, the interviews conducted by the author differed in tone from the written AARs. Many of those interviewed about the integration and interaction between special operations forces and conventional forces spoke negatively of this relationship between the two types of forces. This conflicts with the written views of mostly higher ranking officers. The intent of this study is to answer the research question and find out if the doctrinal parameters behind these operations other than war are useful as measured against the principles of OOTW. As a Special Forces Officer, the author is concerned with these interactions between the two types of forces for professional reasons and in order to learn more about any problems that may relate to future similar operations other than war.

Ironically, in this peace operation, there existed a combat mindset. A quotation from the 10<sup>th</sup> Mountain AAR states: "Every Movement outside of a compound is a "COMBAT OPERATION."<sup>77</sup> This type of warrior comment during and after Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY was typical of conventional force commanders, but not of many special operations commanders. In after action reports, briefings, and discussions, the warrior mindset of the conventional force was evident, begging the question of whether or not this combat mindset is prudent for a peace operation. Was this in fact a peace operation?



Peace Operations are defined by FM 100-5, Operations, as "an umbrella term that encompasses three types of activities; activities with predominantly diplomatic lead (preventive diplomacy, peacekeeping, peace building) and two complementary, predominantly military, activities (peacekeeping and peace-enforcement)."<sup>78</sup> Although this operation included a large diplomatic effort, it was mainly a military peacekeeping mission with the consent of the international community. The military peacekeeping mission facilitated the implementation of the diplomatic efforts to promote democracy in Haiti. The military peace-enforcement portion of this mission enforced UN Resolution 867. The actual mission statement for the Multinational Force Haiti, of which the 10<sup>th</sup> Mountain Division was the main effort, stated: "To establish and maintain a stable and secure environment."<sup>79</sup>

Doctrine requires commanders to assess the situation in terms of force protection.<sup>80</sup> It is a prudent part of any commander's guidance to provide some degree of caution when conducting combat operations or OOTW. This operation began as an invasion, planned for violent action with a combat mindset not only in the planners, but the soldiers as well. With this violent purpose of action the mindset is much more dangerous, demanding a high state of security. Such security measures in a combat type of operation includes the "protection of soldiers, civilian employees, family members, facilities, and equipment in all locations and situations."<sup>81</sup> Force protection is "accomplished through planned and integrated application of combating terrorism, physical security, operations security, personal protective services; supported by intelligence, counterintelligence, and other security programs."<sup>82</sup>

These force protection measures and techniques are not only applicable to combat operations. Operations other than war also require force protection measures. U.S. Army and joint authoritative doctrine

on OOTW define the relationship in terms of principles that relate to both types of operations. "OOTW principles are an extension of warfighting doctrine. Embodied in these principles is the dominance of political objectives at all levels of military operations other than war (MOOTW)."<sup>83</sup> One of the political considerations commanders had to deal with in this operations was the unacceptability of casualties. After the tragic events in Somalia, only one short year before, the U.S. military fully understood that casualties in this peace operation were unacceptable.<sup>84</sup>

The last minute change to the peaceful entry operation was a dramatic shift from the combat operations planned and required a different mindset. The specified and implied tasks were difficult ones for commanders to execute. The designated task to establish and maintain a stable and secure environment called for different techniques than those planned for during the combat operations of the invasion. Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY was executed in a permissive or semi-permissive environment, as opposed to the non-permissive environment planned for the invasion force. One of the differences in the two types of operations is the technique used to ensure force protection.

All military operations are driven by political considerations. "However, military operations other than war are more sensitive to such considerations due to the overriding goal to prevent, preempt, or limit potential hostilities."<sup>85</sup> Commanders had to establish the secure and stable environment, then enforce the peace while avoiding casualties. Commanders were sensitive to the political ramifications of potential casualties and the consequences of failing to establish peace on the streets of Port-au-Prince and in the Haitian countryside. Commanders had to balance the amount of force protection with the techniques of

enforcing peace in the sometimes tense environment of the city streets of Port-au-Prince.

The commanders of this operation chose the techniques used to meet the force protection requirements of the mission. In interviews with the author, soldiers expressed difficulty in understanding their mission and role in terms of force protection. Commanders wanted to show the strength of the force without using force. This is an important concept because using force to solve problems on the streets might raise an already tense level higher and put U.S. troops in a dangerous situation.

In an operation similar to UPHOLD DEMOCRACY, soldiers use different techniques to try and convince civilians, in this case Haitians, that an area is secure and ready for them to return to their normal way of life. One technique is to tailor their appearance and actions, thus simulating a secure environment. Wearing certain items of equipment or protection send a nonverbal message that can help the success of the mission. It is the duty of commanders and planners to make assessments and determine the balance between wearing items for protection versus sending a message towards mission accomplishment. In UPHOLD DEMOCRACY, commanders assessed the threat level to soldiers high enough to warrant the wearing of kevlar combat vests.<sup>86</sup> These vests certainly protected the soldiers to meet the threat, but did not send the message that the streets were safe and secure.

The kevlar combat vests were worn by both conventional and special operations forces as a measure of force protection. An issue developed over this level of force protection at several locations where conventional and special operations forces worked together. Camp d'Application, one of the main targets chosen for the invasion operation was one such target or place where the force protection level was a

problem.<sup>87</sup> Camp d'Application housed the 55-man 22d Company stronghold of the Forces Armes d'Haiti (FAd'H).<sup>88</sup> Camp d'Application was considered such a threat compared to others, that one planner stated: "If we anticipated any significant counterattack or fight, it would probably come from that unit (the company at Camp d'Application)."<sup>89</sup>

As a key target in the invasion plan, Camp d'Application was initially a special operations target for the United States Army Rangers.<sup>90</sup> However, once the invasion was canceled the target became part of the peaceful entry operation. Because of its perceived high threat potential, Camp d'Application was initially occupied by a strong U.S. force consisting of 3<sup>rd</sup> Special Forces Group (Airborne), from Fort Bragg, N.C. These were special operations personnel who remained inside the camp working with the FAd'H to disarm the camp. This FAd'H stronghold operation was a difficult task because of the tense environment of two military elements sharing the same camp, who just hours ago were going to be possibly killing each other in combat.<sup>91</sup> The special operations forces were sent there to identify and inventory the weapons, remove the V-150's and other larger military weapons from the area and render them unserviceable.

In the course of their operation, the special operations troops actually gained the help of the FAd'H to count and uncover weapons from the caches in the 90+ degree heat. The FAd'H assistance came through careful and purposeful negotiating to convince the FAd'H to cooperate. Uncertain of their purpose and their position as an army in a now U.S. occupied country, the FAd'H made the situation "very tense". The U.S. and FAd'H were trying to get used to each other, yet not lose an ounce of credibility. The two forces started to earn each other's trust to the point where the special operations forces could lessen their defenses and shed their kevlar vests and helmets and continue to work

more comfortably in the heat. The technique used in this case was one of cooperation versus confrontation. At one point, FAd'H soldiers stopped carrying their weapons and went to work helping the special operations soldiers.<sup>92</sup>

As this operation was taking place, an element of the 10<sup>th</sup> Mountain Division drove up to the front gate of Camp d'Application to replace the special operations forces. This conventional force appeared in armored vehicles wearing their kevlar vests and helmets with guns aimed at the FAd'H soldiers and demanding entry into the camp. One special forces officer at the camp explained that this was totally unexpected.<sup>93</sup>

At the moment the armored vehicles arrived at the gate at Camp d'Application, the FAd'H soldiers assumed the highest level of security.<sup>94</sup> The special forces soldiers, who had gained the trust and cooperation of the FAd'H over time and convinced them to put their weapons down, instantly lost that trust when the conventional force appeared. The difference in methodology and degree of necessary force protection between special operations forces and conventional forces clearly affected this operation.

The conventional force lack of understanding of the special force methodology did not help the situation. It strained the relationship the U.S. forces had with the FAd'H in terms of who was in charge and who they should trust. It also strained the relationship between the two types of U.S. forces themselves. At one point, a conventional force commander criticized the special operations forces for "being out of uniform" and not conducting what he believed were appropriate security measures in the camp, and applying the "appropriate level of force protection".<sup>95</sup> In this case the special operations force did not wear the kevlar vests because they had lowered the level of

threat from the FAd'H at the camp. There was a different mindset between the two types of forces over this force protection issue.

The principles of OOTW during this event may provide insight to what happened between the special operations and conventional forces. The objective on the part of the special operations force seemed clear with defined and obtainable tasks of inventorying the weapons and rendering the camp secure and safe for use later. The objectives on the part of the conventional force were also clear. They were to basically switch places with the special forces, occupy the camp and take over the tasks, thus freeing up the special forces for other operations. The problem existed because, although the objectives were clear and definable to each other, they were not shared by the two forces.

Unity of effort was clearly one of the main problems at the camp. The two types of U.S. forces did not work together in preparation and planning of the integration on the target site. Not only was this failure in unity of effort, but in understanding the methodology of each of the two types of units and who was in charge of what at the camp. Doctrine states to "seek unity of effort in every operation", not just in the initial planning.<sup>96</sup>

Security was one principle that was actually not a problem in the sense of having enough. The security was managed at a level of reality by the special operations forces over time. The security at the camp immediately rose to a high state when the 10<sup>th</sup> Mountain Division troops entered the camp. With the level of security was a sense of distrust by the FAd'H because of the increase in security. Now the camp was back to everyone carrying guns and the conventional force trying to convince the FAd'H to give up their guns by force and a serious visual

presence of that warrior spirit. This situation required the appropriate level of restraint to deal with the new environment.

Restraint, as another principle of OOTW, also applies in this case. According to doctrine, one should "apply the appropriate military capability prudently."<sup>97</sup> In this case the special operations forces lowered the requirement for security and use of force through their ability to gain the trust of the FAd'H. The conventional force is not used to working under these type of conditions, especially with the operations in Somalia fresh in their minds. The conventional force failed, in this case to use the appropriate restraint for what was required.

Perseverance is the preparation for the "measured, protracted application of military capability in support of strategic aims."<sup>98</sup> In this case, decisive resolution of the occupying conventional force was not the best answer. The techniques used to gain the trust of the soldiers eventually leading to stability was working. The conventional force brought the entire process back to square one when they showed up looking like they were ready for a fight. The intent may not have been to "take down" the camp in true military combat style, but the appearance of that technique was certainly convincing to the FAd'H even if it was untrue. Not knowing or understanding the time it took to build the trust of the FAd'H worked against the conventional force method. The relationship between the two U.S. forces was difficult because of the lack of time built into the plan for working with the FAd'H and building trust and also not fully understanding the perseverance necessary to complete the mission more successfully. The conventional force did not provide the FAd'H with the perception that they had good reasons for the level of force protection they used.

Legitimacy in OOTW is a "condition based on the perception by a

specific audience of the legality, morality, or rightness of a set of actions."<sup>99</sup> The special operations force convinced the FAd'H that the U.S. was the new legitimate military on the ground now and that there was no use in trying to resist. The techniques used by the special operations force allowed the FAd'H to at remain as a professional military force and conduct those military procedures of ensuring security of the camp (along with the U.S.). The conventional force used a strong arm tactic to force the FAd'H into submission to the fact that the U.S. was the new legitimate force on the ground. These are two distinctly different techniques by the two distinctly different forces. Of course, there are situations in which both techniques will work. In this case however, the strong arm method worked against the conventional force which made other tasks in the camp much more difficult to accomplish under the conditions set by the new arrivals.

The integration of conventional forces and special operations forces at Camp d'Application was strained and difficult because of the two approaches to the same problem. Both techniques are valid ones, but the two forces did not understand each others' reasons for using the technique chosen by the other. Obviously, there were problems while both forces thought they were conducting the mission in their own appropriate manner and with the acceptable level of force protection.

The integration of forces in terms of OOTW principles was a difficult one to plan and even more difficult to execute. The principles plainly and directly point out the deficiencies or difficulties in the case of this particular integration at Camp d'Application. This analysis also points out how important the principles are in planning and conducting an integrated effort in a case such as this. The principles of OOTW are the cornerstone of planning in this operation. A planner must consider each of these principles in order to



achieve success in an operation like UPHOLD DEMOCRACY. This operation has other examples where the principles of OOTW impact on force integration and inter-relationship difficulties.

The relocating of the forward operating base (FOB) at the Light Industrial Complex (LIC) in Port-au-Prince was another event that occurred during Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY, involving both conventional and special force integration. The LIC was an area where both special forces and conventional forces worked together planning. The LIC was also the secure base of operations where each unit had separate warehouse style area to use for planning and living. The compound area was actually the warehouse complex for the Port-au-Prince port facility and airport. The conventional force worked directly out of this complex conducting patrols and operations. The special operations forces used this complex for planning and since much of their work was out of town, for relaxation and preparation for the next trip out into the countryside.

One of the purposes of the LIC compound was to provide a secure area for planning and preparation for future operations. Because the LIC compound was a secure area housing U.S. troops, it required an appropriate military appearance. Certain rules applied inside the compound such as speed limits, off limits areas and proper uniforms and protocol for all those who entered; all of this strictly in the sense of conducting a military operation with standards. However, there were certain unwritten rules that placed the special operations forces at a distinct operational disadvantage while living within the compound with the conventional mindset.

These unwritten rules inside the LIC ranged from special operations soldiers not allowed to use a weight room facility controlled by a conventional force element, to minor on-the-spot corrections

made on special operations soldiers returning from the lengthy field operations.<sup>100</sup> The environment was described by some soldiers as almost discriminatory. The attitude that existed between conventional forces and special operations forces is alarming and shows a lack of understanding and planning with the principles of OOTW to meet the different needs and requirements of these two distinct forces.

Conventional force commanders were in charge of the operation and carried over the "combat" theme into the way in which operations were conducted. The special force units were also bound to follow the rules such as wearing the kevlar vest for protection at all times once outside the secure LIC compound.<sup>101</sup>

The author listened to over 70 hours of interviews, many of which were typical soldier gripes from good soldiers trying to their jobs. The LIC compound was supposed to act as the hub of the operation. The place where the planning occurred and soldiers could get a little rest before going back out in the field locations where they worked most of the time. It was a home away from home for the special operations forces and conventional forces alike. A place where they could get a hot shower, a good meal and a break away from the operation, where they worked for up to 30 days at a time. The special operations forces in general "feared returning to the LIC" "and would rather stay out in the villages in some cases versus go back to the LIC", because of the almost hostile environment there.<sup>102</sup> The circumstances at the LIC did not promote the proper cooperative relationship for these two forces in terms of planning and distracted from the overall purpose of the operation.

The FOB was the actual operations center for the special operations activities in the sector. Throughout the operation there were different levels of planning and sectors developed to meet the

requirements of the operations with FOBs to support and control the special operations forces. One FOB initially set up at Camp d'Application and moved to Fort Lamentine, about an hour away, because of the conventional force environment.<sup>105</sup> The reason why the FOB moved out is important. It shows that the special operations planners would rather move away than have to put up with the distractions with the conventional force.

The LIC is an example of an administrative environment (secure compound) which also requires planning to set up and operate efficiently. Since it is an OOTW type operation, it requires the application of the principles of OOTW during the planning for the operation of this compound by doctrine, just as it would for any other type of operation. The relationship between the conventional and special operations forces was at times difficult at the tactical level, even in a secure environment. This became an operational distracter for planners from both forces with similar objectives.

The principle of objective in the above example was clearly defined to each of the forces. There is no evidence of either force not having a clear objective while at the LIC. There were separate operations going on at the LIC by the two types of forces. Each had specific objectives to provide command, control and conduct necessary coordinations within the compound. Some of the operations themselves were not as clear as the commanders may have wanted, but the daily planning for operations and responsibilities were clear and doctrinally correct as the forces worked together.

Unity of effort as a principle of OOTW was not always evident. This principle was a difficult one to abide by because of the sometimes strange and complicated command arrangements between not only the conventional and special operations forces, but the United

Nations and other governmental and non-governmental participants. The doctrine mentions the difficulty of "varying views of the objective".<sup>104</sup> This point is key to the difficulty at the LIC between the conventional and special operations force. Doctrine states that unity of effort in OOTW calls for heavy reliance on consensus building to achieve unity of effort.<sup>105</sup> The environment described in the interviews does not show that this was the case at all. However, the generalization one can make from the AARs is that at the higher levels of the military, "The integration of special operations forces and conventional forces worked well throughout the operation"<sup>106</sup>

The principle of security was really not a factor in this inter-relationship problem. Both forces established and maintained a proper security posture that did not affect the relationship between them. One specific item of interest at the LIC was a misunderstanding on the part of the conventional force (at lower tactical levels) of the organization and rank structure of the special operations forces, which is usually higher than that of the conventional force. The special operations non-commissioned officers do not normally replace lower ranking enlisted soldiers for such duties. Instead, they may hold the higher ranking positions of Sergeant of the Guard. This problem stemmed from a conventional force element not familiar with special operations forces. This problem was quickly solved.<sup>107</sup>

As a principle of OOTW, restraint was not a major factor in the planning process as were the other principles. Concerning restraint, the problems were mainly due to the lack of professional cooperation in a difficult environment with very different methods of operation. The problems in this case went beyond any petty personality difficulties. They were significant with respect to the conduct of the operation in the techniques used and the morale of the soldiers of both forces. As

with perseverance and legitimacy, restraint as a principle of OOTW was not a major factor in the case described above.

Both of these examples point to the difference in views from different levels within the military. The tactical level or ground level of operation between conventional and special operations forces can be very different from the view of the those who write the final after action reports. The lower ranking individuals in the military sometimes take pride in the ability to grumble with precision although it may not always be accurate. The higher ranking officers sometimes seem to paint a more generic and optimistic view of the same situation. In both cases the degree of precision is never questioned, but sometimes the accuracy of the truth can be difficult to obtain.

## CHAPTER 4

### Conclusion

Future military operations in OOTW will require both conventional and special operations forces. The use of military force is changing from mostly war type operations to operations other than war. "Since 1988, the number of peace operations has more than doubled, with each succeeding one being more complex than the last."<sup>108</sup> One of the most important things the army can do to meet the challenges with success is remain flexible. This flexibility is the key to the nature of doctrine because doctrine must be dynamic and change as new lessons are learned from operations such as in Haiti.

This study introduces the subject of integration of conventional and special operations forces. The analysis of a few of the events in Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY shows how important the principles of OOTW are in planning and executing an operation other than war. Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY is an example of an operation planned for two extremes of the military spectrum, combat operations and peace operations. A unique situation occurred in this operation when it suddenly changed from an invasion to a peaceful entry to restore democracy in Haiti. This created a problem concerning the integration of the different types of forces.

Problems with force integration are not new to the military.

Although an overall success, URGENT FURY highlighted persistent deficiencies; inadequate intelligence, inadequate training of some elements, lack of communications interoperability among conventional and special operations forces, inadequate equipment, and --in particular-- the inability to properly integrate SOF into the overall plan.<sup>109</sup>

Many of these deficiencies are now corrected. During Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM one of the lessons learned was "SOF are truly effective when fully integrated into the theater campaign plan."<sup>110</sup> However, the difficulty in integration of special operations and conventional forces remain apparent today. The future holds new operations and hopefully new solutions to old problems.

Future operations will include the integration and interaction between conventional and special operations forces in OOTW. Each of these forces use different techniques to solve the same problems, even though they have common goals. The different techniques require a complete understanding on the part of planners who intend to integrate these forces in the operation or more specifically, at objectives. The use of OOTW doctrine and especially the principles of objective, security, unity of effort, legitimacy, perseverance, and restraint by planners ensures a more complete planning process. The current OOTW doctrine with its principles is sufficient to avoid problems in executing an operation similar to UPHOLD DEMOCRACY. Current doctrine must remain the subject of contemporary study to keep its dynamic characteristic. This creates a challenge for leaders to continue to look into the future and write doctrine that meets future requirements and more importantly, save lives.

This study determined that the current doctrinal and operational parameters for force integration of special operations and conventional forces are doctrinally correct. The key to successful OOTW is the application of the principles of OOTW in planning and execution of these operations. Events such as those described in this study would not contain the associated problems if planners applied the principles of OOTW in their planning process. It is apparent that planners did not always take into account the principles of OOTW in its planning or

execution of the integrated operations. OOTW doctrine provides a guide to planners that is generally correct and useful in successful mission accomplishment.

The research for this study has determined that there is a void in doctrine when it comes to planning force protection. It is not clear in doctrine how to balance the amount of force protection required to meet the objective with the techniques and equipment used to obtain the objective. Rules of engagement (ROE) are a partial answer to force protection, but soldiers usually think of these as offensive rules. The ROE dictate exactly what level of response a soldier can use in specific instances.<sup>111</sup>

In the future, unique "out of the box" ideas will be needed to produce the answers to problems such as how to best integrate different forces in OOTW. By studying the inter-relationships of the forces in operations such as in Haiti, new ideas may breed new solutions to future problems. These answers may be found in doctrine, additional training, shared experiences in exercises and training events or schools. Another potential solution, currently used, is permanent integration such as the current special operations coordination element (SOCOORD) and special operations command and control element (SOCCE) or other types of task organizations with existing elements.<sup>112</sup> Other solutions are currently being developed.

Major General William F. Garrison, a former commander of special operations forces, developed a proposal to answer not only the special operations organization for the future changing military responses required, but for a mix of special and general purpose forces as well.<sup>113</sup> There is no doubt that today's operational environment is changing and the role of special and conventional operations is changing and a solution that meets the uncertain requirements across the broad spectrum



from the tactical level of war to the diplomatic level of coordination is needed. Discussion has already begun in terms of special operations. In fact, a proposed "exceptional force" concept was introduced by Major General Garrison at the December 1995 conference of the American Defense Preparedness Association.<sup>114</sup>

The exceptional force is defined as: "any element of the combined-arms team or service that dominates a given operations and plays the decisive role."<sup>115</sup> In terms of special operations, a task-organized Army special operations brigade might consist of special forces, civil affairs, psychological operations, as well as elements of infantry, aviation, combat support and combat service support to fit a particular mission. One of the outcomes of a force configured like this is it provides the essence of a "dynamic team" that can be used or advise the joint and interagency team effort.<sup>116</sup> A new idea like the "exceptional force" can become a model for future operations instead of solely relying on past operations.

The 10<sup>th</sup> Mountain Division AAR stated: "In the future this operation will serve as a model for future SOF missions and conventional missions that include SOF."<sup>117</sup> If this is true one must be careful to only model the successful portions of the operation and maintain acute awareness of the difficulties or failures. "SOF usually are not an independent, stand alone force."<sup>118</sup> Integration and interaction between the two types of forces is very probable in future operations.

"The SFODA commanders are breaking ground in operations other than war that could easily become a part of conventional operations in the future."<sup>119</sup> The sharing of innovative ideas and techniques are needed to successfully conduct future OOTW. Unity of effort, or working together in OOTW is paramount to success today and will remain the key to success in the future. Understanding the methods of the two types of

forces together with doctrinal principles such as those in OOTW, is one of the first steps any planner should take towards planning a successful operation. Research shows that there was an obvious disregard for not only doctrine, but the other forces methods. The principles are described in many doctrinal manuals and by analyzing the events in this study, it is evident that the principles of OOTW were not applied. It is also apparent that the failure to coordinate to find out exactly what methods the other force used in the different situations created unnecessary problems. The 10<sup>th</sup> Mountain Division AAR states: "Key To Success...Coordinated planning and synchronization of conventional and special operations."<sup>120</sup> This coordination is the cornerstone to success.

The monograph research demonstrates the disparate views held by varying ranks of the military over the success of Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY. While higher ranking officers gave glowing reviews of just about everything, lower ranking officers and soldiers had a much different view of the same events. It is evident in the research that one reason for claiming success is summed up in the 10<sup>th</sup> Mountain Division AAR statement: "Also, soldiers like to be winners. On the scale of failure to success, Haiti was way up on the success."<sup>121</sup> This is true overall. The soldiers performed within the guidelines their commanders provided in an outstanding manner. The soldiers' view of the battlefield or area of operation is sometimes different from that of the commanders'. What is important to soldiers on the ground is not always as important to commanders. Commanders who listen and try to understand the situation from the soldiers' view can often develop solutions to larger problems or sometimes avoid problems all together. Military operations in Haiti during Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY confirm the doctrinal requirement for close cooperation between conventional and special operations forces in OOTW environments.

ENDNOTES

<sup>1</sup>See Bibliography, specifically the Joint After Action Report, Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY JAAR, United States Atlantic Command (Norfolk, VA: United States Atlantic Command, 1995).

<sup>2</sup>FM 100-23, Peace Operations (Washington, DC: Headquarters Department of the Army December 1994), II-2.

<sup>3</sup>Ibid.

<sup>4</sup>Ibid., iii.

<sup>5</sup>10<sup>th</sup> Mountain Division, Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY, Operations in Haiti Planning/Preparation/Execution, August 1994 Thru January 1995, 13-2.

<sup>6</sup>"Haiti," Microsoft ® Encarta '95. The Complete Interactive Multimedia Encyclopedia (CD-ROM).

<sup>7</sup>Ibid.

<sup>8</sup>Ibid.

<sup>9</sup>Ibid.

<sup>10</sup>Ibid. The Tonton Macoute was an oppressive armed force under the Duvalier tyrannical regime that executed some 2000 political enemies.

<sup>11</sup>Ibid.

<sup>12</sup>Ibid.

<sup>13</sup>Lieutenant Colonel Stephen M. Epstein, Lieutenant Colonel Robert S. Cronon and Colonel James G. Pulley, "JTF Haiti: A United Nations Foreign Internal Defense Mission," Special Warfare, July 1994, 3.

<sup>14</sup>Ibid.

<sup>15</sup>Ibid.

<sup>16</sup>Ibid.

<sup>17</sup>Ibid., 8.

<sup>18</sup>Ibid., 7.

<sup>19</sup>Ibid., 8.

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<sup>20</sup>Lieutenant Colonel James L. Dunn and Major Jon M. Custer, "Operation Uphold Democracy: The Role of the SOCOORD as Part of a Joint Task Force," Special Warfare, July 1995, 29.

<sup>21</sup>United States Atlantic Command, Joint After Action Report, Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY JAAR, United States Atlantic Command (Norfolk, VA: United States Atlantic Command, 1995), 6.

<sup>22</sup>See 10<sup>th</sup> Mountain Division, Operations UPHOLD DEMOCRACY, OPERATIONS IN HAITI PLANNING/PREPARATION/EXECUTION, August 1994 Thru January 1995, 22-2.

<sup>23</sup>Ibid.

<sup>24</sup>The author conducted a series of interviews in Port-au-Prince, Haiti in January 1996 with military officers, non-commissioned officers, civilians, and local Haitians. A clear distinction was apparent between the higher level officer's positive view of the integration of forces and those at the lower tactical levels of Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY who viewed more problems with the integration of conventional with special operations forces.

<sup>25</sup>United States Atlantic Command, Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY JAAR, 2.

<sup>26</sup>George Bush, National Security Strategy (Washington, DC: The White House, 1991), 8.

<sup>27</sup>United States Atlantic Command, Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY JAAR, 6.

<sup>28</sup>United States Atlantic Command, Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY JAAR, 12.

<sup>29</sup>It is difficult to determine from the research exactly where the term "forcible entry" originated. It is believed to have come from someone in the Pentagon during the early days of planning mainly to distinguish OPLAN 2380-95 from OPLAN 2370-95. It is also believed by the author that the term was used as a substitute for the word "invasion" as part of the Top Secret requirement placed upon planners to allow the maximum success for political solutions while the military was planning its missions. The term "forcible entry" does not have the same mass and violent connotation "invasion" does."

<sup>30</sup>United States Atlantic Command, Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY JAAR, 7.

<sup>31</sup>Ibid.

<sup>32</sup>Ibid.

<sup>33</sup>Ibid.

<sup>34</sup>David Bentley, National Defense University, Strategic Forum, "Operation Uphold Democracy: Military Support for Democracy in Haiti," Institute for National Strategic Studies, no. 78, (June 1996), 1.

<sup>35</sup>United States Atlantic Command, Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY JAAR, 8.

<sup>36</sup>Ibid., 9.

<sup>37</sup>Sean Naylor, "The invasion that never was," Army Times, The Independent Weekly, 26 February 1996, 12.

<sup>38</sup>Ibid., 12-13.

<sup>39</sup>United States Atlantic Command, Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY JAAR, 10.

<sup>40</sup>Ibid.

<sup>41</sup>Ibid., 11. Information about the USS America was from the authors personal experience and a caption from the back of an official photo of the USS America presented to the author by a commander within the USSOCOM.

<sup>42</sup>Ibid.

<sup>43</sup>Ibid.

<sup>44</sup>The term integration is used in the sense of interaction or mixing both conventional and special operations in either a support role, one force supporting the other or the operational ability to conduct operations together to achieve a common result. The terms "interoperability" and "combined" are defined according to doctrinal definitions respectively in FM 100-5.

<sup>45</sup>Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Pub 3-05, Doctrine For Joint Special Operations (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1992), GL-20. Approved as a new term and definition for Joint Pub 1-02.

<sup>46</sup>Ibid. Same definition in Joint Pub 1-02.

<sup>47</sup>The principles of operations other than war are: unity of effort, objective, legitimacy, perseverance, restraint and security.

<sup>48</sup>Togo D. West, and General Gordon R. Sullivan. United States Army Posture Statement, FY 96, Selected Committees and Subcommittees of the United States Senate and the House of Representatives, February 1995, 104<sup>th</sup> Congress 1<sup>st</sup> session (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1995), 34.

<sup>49</sup>See 10<sup>th</sup> Mountain Division, Operations UPHOLD DEMOCRACY, OPERATIONS IN HAITI PLANNING/PREPARATION/EXECUTION, August 1994 Thru January 1995, 22-2.

<sup>50</sup>Headquarters Department of the Army, FM 31-20, Doctrine for Special Forces Operations (Ft Bragg, NC: United States Army John F.

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Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, February 1990), 1-9. The special operations mission criteria are outlined in a handbook entitled Special Operations Forces Handbook, A Reference Guide for Special Operations Forces produced by one of the author's classes (A525, Special Operations Forces Advanced Studies) during his attendance at the Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, KS in 1996, page 1-2. The special operations mission criteria are: Is this an appropriate SOF mission? Does it support the CINC's Campaign plan? Is it operationally feasible? Are required resources available to execute? Does the expected outcome justify the risk?

<sup>51</sup>The author was a member of the JTF 120 staff from 18 October to 23 November 1993, onboard the USS Nassau (LHA 4), I observed the planning and execution of this joint mission mainly between the U.S. Navy and the Special Purpose Marine Air Ground Task Force (SPMAGTF) for the MIO and other contingency operations. The Army and Air Force maintained LNO's and planners for short periods of time to coordinate planning.

<sup>52</sup>Sean Naylor, "The invasion that never was," Army Times, The Independent Weekly, 26 February 1996, 13.

<sup>53</sup>Since this topic is still recent history, the author relied on the primary source collection of interviews conducted by himself and other members of a Haiti research committee from the Command and General Staff College in February 1996. The research also includes articles from news papers, professional military journals and after action reviews from different levels of planning of both special and conventional operations. Other avenues of research include the use of the Army Knowledge Network, the Combined Arms Research Library, the National Technical Information Services, the Joint Electronic Library, Defense Technical Information Center, and the Joint Universal Lessons Learned System.

<sup>54</sup>FM 100-23, Peace Operations (Washington DC: Headquarters Department of the Army December 1994), iv-v.

<sup>55</sup>Ibid., v.

<sup>56</sup>See the series of TRADOC messages from December 1995 to the present on this subject.

<sup>57</sup>FM 100-23, Peace Operations, 111.

<sup>58</sup>FM 100-5, Operations (Washington, DC: Headquarters Department of the Army 14 June 1993), 13-0. See also: Joint Pub 3-07, Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, January 1995), Final Draft, II-1 to II-8.

<sup>59</sup>FM 100-5, Operations, Glossary-6. These operations normally involve U.S. citizens whose lives are in danger. They may also include selected host nation natives and third country nationals.

<sup>60</sup>During the period prior to the return of President Aristide (September -October 1994) the author observed many demonstrations both

celebrating and denouncing the return of President Aristide to Haiti. The significance of these demonstrations are that although that on most occasions they were peaceful, at any moment they could have turned violent and possibly force the U.S. soldiers to step up to more forceful means of trying to keep the peace. At this time, it is a common belief in Haiti that only about 10% of all of the former Haitian Army's weapons have been turned over to the U.S. and multinational forces. Thus one may conclude that there are many weapons left in Haiti, somewhere.

<sup>61</sup>FM 100-5, Operations (Washington, DC: Headquarters Department of the Army 14 June 1993), 15.

<sup>62</sup>Ibid., 13-3.

<sup>63</sup>Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Pub 3-07, Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War, (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, January 1995), II-8.

<sup>64</sup>Ibid.

<sup>65</sup>Ibid., 13-4.

<sup>66</sup>Ibid.

<sup>67</sup>Ibid.

<sup>68</sup>Ibid.

<sup>69</sup>FM 100-5, Operations, Glossary-8, defines "rules of engagement as directives issued by competent military authority that delineate the circumstances and limitations under which US forces will initiate and/or continue combat engagement with other encountered forces."

<sup>70</sup>Ibid., 13-4.

<sup>71</sup>Sean Naylor, "The Invasion That Never Was," Army Times, The Independent Weekly, 26 February, 1996, 16.

<sup>72</sup>FM 100-23, Peace Operations, 31-39.

<sup>73</sup>Headquarters, Department of the Army, FM 100-25, Doctrine for Army Special Operations Forces (Ft Bragg, NC: United States Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, 12 December 1991), 4-36.

<sup>74</sup>Ibid.

<sup>75</sup>United States Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, Special Operations Command and Control Element (SOCCE) Handbook (Ft Bragg, NC: United States Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, 1 February 1994), I-1.

<sup>76</sup>The author attended several AARs after the initial missions were completed from about October 1994 through January 1995. Most of these AARs were with units from special forces or special operations units involved with the initial invasion plan. Additional information concerning AARs were in written form and can be found in the bibliography of this monograph. The topic of this research was formed

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out of a series of interviews conducted in February 1996 by the author and several others from the Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, KS as part of a Haiti study effort focused on the official history of Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY.

<sup>77</sup>From Commander's observations; force protection: See 10<sup>th</sup> Mountain Division, Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY, OPERATIONS IN HAITI Planning/Preparation/Execution, August 1994 Thru January 1995, 22-30.

<sup>78</sup>FM 100-5, Operations (Washington, DC: Headquarters Department of the Army 14 June 1993), 111.

<sup>79</sup>From Multinational Force Haiti Mission Statement, See 10<sup>th</sup> Mountain Division, Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY, OPERATIONS IN HAITI Planning/Preparation/Execution, August 1994 Thru January 1995, 1-6.

<sup>80</sup>Ibid., 106.

<sup>81</sup>Ibid.

<sup>82</sup>Ibid.

<sup>83</sup>Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Pub 3-07, Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War, (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, January 1995), Final Draft, II-8.

<sup>84</sup>Reference to the October 3, 1993 Mogadishu, Somalia military operation where sixteen special operations soldiers died in a battle when two helicopters were shot down and Rangers were surrounded by hundreds of Somali militia.

<sup>85</sup>Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Pub 3-07, Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War, I-1.

<sup>86</sup>See photo of soldiers conducting a "peaceful" patrol in the streets of Port-au-Prince. The kevlar vests are made to stop small caliber projectiles and smother the effects of larger projectiles to hopefully save the life of the wearer. Togo D. West, and General Gordon R. Sullivan. United States Army Posture Statement, FY 96, Selected Committees and Subcommittees of the United States Senate and the House of Representatives, February 1995, 104<sup>th</sup> Congress, 1<sup>st</sup> Session (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1995), 19.

<sup>87</sup>Sean Naylor, "The Invasion That Never Was," Army Times, The Independent Weekly, 26 February 1996, 13.

<sup>88</sup>Ibid. Camp d'Application was the heavy weapons company stronghold of the Haitian Army. It housed several Cadillac Gage V-150 Commando armored cars equipped with heavy machine guns. This target was key because of its unknown storage areas or caches and condition of weapons located in these caches.

<sup>89</sup>Ibid. This was a quote by Lieutenant Colonel Gordon Bonham, the XVIII Airborne Corps Director of Plans from the article.

<sup>90</sup>Ibid.



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<sup>91</sup> Sean Naylor, "The Invasion That Never Was," Army Times, The Independent Weekly, 26 February 1996, 13.

<sup>92</sup>This information was obtained in an interview with two special operations soldiers who participated in this specific operation, who wish to remain unnamed. The interview was conducted in Port-au-Prince, Haiti, 13 January 1996 by the author.

<sup>93</sup>At this time in the operation, it was considered normal for the 10<sup>th</sup> Mountain Division soldiers to were all of this force protection equipment due to the guidance from their commanders and their assessment of the situation.

<sup>94</sup>Ibid.

<sup>95</sup>Ibid. There was a complete failure of the conventional force to try and understand what the special operations forces were trying to do and how they were doing it inside the camp. The two types of forces were forced to work this problem out on the ground inside the camp, in front of the FAd'H soldiers who were already confused about what was going on and who to trust.

<sup>96</sup>Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Pub 3-07, Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War, II-2.

<sup>97</sup>Ibid., II-3.

<sup>98</sup>Ibid., II-4.

<sup>99</sup>Ibid.

<sup>100</sup>Author's interview with a special operations "A" Team Leader (Captain) and an Operations Noncommissioned Officer (Sergeant First Class) assigned to 3<sup>rd</sup> Special Forces Group on 16 January 1996, Port-au-Prince, Haiti who as of this writing have not yet approved the information for release. Both of these individuals were very candid and returned for at least two six month tours during this operation. Their experience at the LIC and in within Haiti in general is extensive. The accounts of events and problems at the LIC with conventional forces have been verified by others of both conventional and special operations forces during separate interviews.

<sup>101</sup>From a briefing given to the author upon arriving at the LIC, Port-au-Prince, Haiti from the protocol officer concerning the rules, regulations, and safety while visiting the units living at the LIC, January, 1995.

<sup>102</sup>Ibid.

<sup>103</sup>Ibid.

<sup>104</sup>Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Pub 3-07, Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War, II-2.

<sup>105</sup>Ibid.

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<sup>106</sup>10<sup>th</sup> Mountain Division, Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY, OPERATIONS IN HAITI Planning/Preparation/Execution, August 1994 Thru January 1995, 22-2.

<sup>107</sup>See author's interview, 16 January 1996.

<sup>108</sup>FM 100-23, Peace Operations (Washington, DC: Headquarters Department of the Army December 1994), v.

<sup>109</sup>See USSOCOM PUB 1, Special Operations in Peace and WAR (Tampa, FL: Headquarters United States Special Operations Command, 25 January 1996, 2-17.

<sup>110</sup>Ibid., 2-23.

<sup>111</sup>FM 100-5, Operations (Washington, DC: Headquarters Department of the Army June 1993), Glossary-8.

<sup>112</sup>USSOCOM PUB 1, Special Operations in Peace and War, 6-9.

<sup>113</sup>Major General William F. Garrison (ret.) and Colonel Hayward S. Florer Jr., "A View from the Field: Army Special Operations Forces in the Current and Future Security Environments," Special Warfare, May 1996, 8.

<sup>114</sup>Ibid.

<sup>115</sup>Ibid., 14.

<sup>116</sup>Ibid.

<sup>117</sup>10<sup>th</sup> Mountain Division Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY, Operations in Haiti, Planning/Preparation/Execution, August 1994 Thru January 1995, Copy obtained from the Haiti research committee temporary archives, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 1996, 13-3.

<sup>118</sup>USSOCOM PUB 1, Special Operations in Peace and WAR, 2-31.

<sup>119</sup>Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) United States Army Training and Doctrine Command, Operations UPHOLD DEMOCRACY Initial Impressions, "Haiti D-20 to D+150, Vol. II. Operations Other Than War" (Ft. Leavenworth, KS: Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) United States Army Training and Doctrine Command), April 1995, 131.

<sup>120</sup>10<sup>th</sup> Mountain Division Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY, Operations in Haiti, Planning/Preparation/Execution, August 1994 Thru January 1995, 13-5.

<sup>121</sup>Ibid., 24-3.

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#### Interviews

Interviews were conducted with well over 40 members of the armed forces and civilians in the Port-au-Prince area in February 1996 by myself, John T. Fishel, Ph.D., and Robert F. Baumann, Ph.D., during a research

visit. I chose not to cite any of the persons interviewed, although all interviews are recorded and awaiting transcription. I used the information from all of these points of view to provide an extensive wealth of knowledge as a background to better understand the environment in Haiti during the planning, execution, and withdrawal of forces.

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